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"FRAMES OF REFERENCE" AND "PRE-THEORIES"  
A COMPARISON OF THE FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES  
OF J. N. ROSENAU AND R. C. SNYDER

by



VICTOR E. GOOCH

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "FRAMES OF REFERENCE" AND "PRE-THEORIES" A COMPARISON OF THE FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES OF J. N. ROSENAU AND R. C. SNYDER, submitted by Victor E. Gooch in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation compares the foreign policy "approaches" of R. C. Snyder and J. N. Rosenau. While Snyder's "Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics" (1954) and Rosenau's "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" (1966) constitute the core sources an attempt has been made to clarify the approaches of the authors by reference to a number of recent publications. Such a comprehensive examination, in addition to clarifying each approach, considerably aids the task of comparison.

The approaches of Snyder and Rosenau are found to be different in a number of key areas. The "decision-making" approach differs from Rosenau's "pre-Theories" approach particularly in respect to each author's stipulation of levels of analysis, dependent and independent variables and in their respective views regarding the "phenomenological issue." A chapter is devoted to comparing the two approaches in each of the above areas.

The final chapter (Chapter Four) is concerned with the operational utility of the two analytical schemes. Empirical reference is made to the United States decision to resist aggression in Korea. In spite of the major differences between the approaches noted above, both experience difficulties with empirical data. Snyder's categories, it has been noted, are illusively stipulated





(constantly changing) and imprecisely defined. Rosenau's categories, while more clearly stipulated, are, like Snyder's, extremely difficult to operationalize. However, given Rosenau's non-phenomenological orientation, more exacting effort may establish adequate categories. The operationalization of Snyder's categories will, it is strongly suspected, prove much more difficult.



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## Introduction

Methods of examining international phenomena have not remained static.<sup>1</sup> The approaches of the past twenty years have exhibited considerable dissatisfaction, if not progress, in the manner that international phenomena were examined. While many scholars continue to cling to traditional orientations,<sup>2</sup> innovation in both orientation and technique is becoming more and more the rule rather than the exception. As early as 1949, for example, it was noted that researchers were shifting their attention from "descriptive analysis of formal governmental structures toward the closer observation of political process."<sup>3</sup> More recently, another scholar has characterized the post-war period as a time when interests turned from

solving problems and reforming institutions to understanding processes and identifying causation. If a single label had to be given to this new phase it would be the word systematic.<sup>4</sup>

It is generally accepted that an ever-present feature of systematic investigation is the search for more adequate and fruitful categories and concepts with which to identify, organize, describe and interpret international phenomena. Accordingly, such systematic inquiry implies an implicit or explicit (preferably) commitment to the task of "theory-building." Such a theory is broadly regarded, according to



Stanley Hoffmann's use of the term, as a "systematic effort at asking questions which will allow us to organize our knowledge, to orient our research and to interpret our findings."<sup>5</sup>

This paper is primarily concerned with what is known as "empirical" theory. Unlike "normative" or "philosophical" theory, empirical theory is concerned with "facts" or factual observations--past, present and future. Usually relying on scientific procedures to procure factual observations, empirical theory demands the formulation of a "series of related propositions purporting to identify and explain, within a given frame of reference, either data of observation already made or the expected findings from new observations which the theory indicates could be made."<sup>6</sup>

Full-fledged theory, composed of a series of interdependent statements relating or linking independent and dependent variables, are extremely scarce in the study of international phenomena. Compared to other disciplines, international relations is in a rather primitive stage of development. More often than not, the word "theory" is used not in the sophisticated sense of a series of statements that specify relations among variables but rather in the sense of an "approach" or "conceptual scheme" referring only to a set of categories useful in analysis. Although an "approach" is less technical than a "theory," it should be noted that approaches to analysis are important. This is true so far as they "are epistemologically antecedent to theories in the sense that it is logically impossible to construct theoretical statements with-



out the prior development of an approach to analysis either explicitly or implicitly."<sup>7</sup> Clearly, one's approach to analysis will have a considerable impact on the eventual development of empirical theory.

Although few attempts have been made to develop a general theory of international politics, even less emphasis has been placed on the theoretical development of foreign policy. The two fields of concern are differentiable. A theory of international politics is thought to be concerned with the explanation and prediction of the "interactions" between states while a theory of foreign policy focuses on the "actions" of individual states.<sup>8</sup> To date, only three attempts at formulating a general theory of foreign policy have been attempted: R. C. Snyder's, et al., "Decision-making as an Approach to International Politics"<sup>9</sup> (1954), G. Modelski's, A Theory of Foreign Policy<sup>10</sup> (1962) and J. N. Rosenau's "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy"<sup>11</sup> (1966). Judging from the recent literature, Snyder's and Rosenau's attempts are very much "alive" and thriving. Modelski's work, on the other hand, has been largely neglected. This paper is primarily concerned with the theoretical attempts of R. C. Snyder and J. N. Rosenau.

While both Snyder and Rosenau are interested in developing a general empirical theory of foreign policy, they admit that their attempts, as they now stand, fall far short of this goal. Indeed, they both indicate that their efforts should be regarded only as a "preliminary exercise to identify





some of the crucial variables that determine national responses to concrete situations"<sup>12</sup> or, as an attempt to "identify and amplify the materials out of which any theory of foreign policy must be fashioned."<sup>13</sup> Considering such admissions it seems unfair to criticize either approach for its lack of theory.<sup>14</sup> In the sense of the distinction made earlier between a "theory" and an "approach," Snyder's and Rosenau's attempts clearly constitute "approaches" to analysis rather than full-fledged theories. Snyder considers his approach as a "frame of reference" while Rosenau considers his orientation as a "pre-theory."

The aim of this paper is to compare the foreign policy approaches of R. C. Snyder and J. N. Rosenau. A further, and necessarily connected, goal considering the complexity of the approaches, is simply to clarify. The subject or chapter headings--levels of analysis, dependent and independent variables, phenomenology and operationalization--are by no means independent of each other and contain a number of topics related to the subject heading. Hopefully, however, such broad topics of analysis will provide the reader with a solid basis of contrasting the foreign policy approaches of R. C. Snyder and J. N. Rosenau.





## Chapter One

### Levels of Analysis

Since political scientists and other researchers studying international phenomena became concerned with the development of theory they have tended to evolve their own terminology or vocabulary which presumably is more precise than ordinary language. One of the earliest additions to the language of theorists was "level of analysis." Unfortunately, although "level of analysis" is extensively used in international and social theory generally, political scientists do not appear to be agreed as to either the meaning or the use of the terminology. R. C. Snyder has suggested that the problem is derived from the word "level," which in his opinion is ambiguous and denotes at least three interpretations: the level at which phenomena occur; the level at which explanation is formulated; and the level at which data are collected.<sup>1</sup> Surprisingly, however, in spite of this indeterminacy and confusion, the concept has some utility and, as H. C. Kelman indicates, it is rather difficult to do without.<sup>2</sup>

Ostensibly, it appears that the concept "level of analysis" is conceived as an analytic tool useful in organizing and observing phenomena of considerable complexity. Given complex phenomena, one of the first prerequisites of systematic analysis is the "development of a division of scientific



labor."<sup>3</sup> The analyst intending to analyze complex phenomena is immediately faced with a choice involving the level of abstraction upon which he wishes to examine the phenomena. For example, does he wish to examine the parts or the whole, the macro- or the micro- level of analysis? The analyst may for example "choose between the flowers or the garden, the rocks or the quarry, the trees or the forest, the houses or the neighborhood, the car or the traffic jam, the delinquents or the gang, the legislators or the legislative, and so on."<sup>4</sup> Indeed, analysis may conceivably consist of a hierarchy of different levels of analysis examining a range of data from gross abstraction to progressively more and more minute and detailed levels. Regardless of the difficulty of choice, the analyst cannot escape making a methodological commitment to a level upon which he intends to examine international phenomena.

Traditionally, the study of international phenomena has focused on two levels: the international and the national; or, in the language of the systems theorist, on the international and national systems. At the international level analysts are particularly concerned with the macro- level of abstraction focusing, as it was noted in the introduction, on the "interactions" which occur between states. At the lower national or micro-level of abstraction the observer is interested primarily in the "actions" of the states themselves. In other words, at the international level the observer is interested in what is known as international politics, while at the national level the analyst is observing foreign policy.





Until recently, the state was conceived as the sole actor who could "properly be said to perform on the international stage."<sup>5</sup> The state was endowed like a human being with a will and a mind that permitted it to reach decisions and carry them out. Psychological traits and other internal factors motivating these actors were deemed shared by all states in a constant or similar fashion. Consequently, the national level of analysis could be neglected or treated in a cavalier fashion. In other words, using the latest analytical terminology, the state (viewed in an abstract, reified sense) was conceived as the sole "unit of analysis."<sup>6</sup>

A. Wolfers, however, indicates that following World War II there occurred a distinct reaction against the abstract personification of the state.<sup>7</sup> Recently, those engaged in the "action" or foreign policy focus have exhibited an increasing tendency to interject individuals into their analysis. Wolfers sees this departure as representing a "swing of the pendulum from an extreme state emphasis to an equally extreme emphasis on the men who act for states."<sup>8</sup> While he continues to view the "action" approach in the usual abstract state-as-sole actor sense, he does admit that the individual level of analysis may "supplement" the traditional focus.<sup>9</sup> This admission by Wolfers appears at least to lend credence to the usual systems notion that the "state may be viewed as occupying one level in a multi-level hierarchy of systems."<sup>10</sup>

It should be noted, however, that the choice of a level of analysis is made with strong implications for the





whole approach of the analyst. Singer, for example, has noted that, in regard to the most widely employed national and international levels, the researcher's choice profoundly affects the descriptive, explanatory and predictive adequacy of the model.<sup>11</sup> The degree of abstraction present has both advantages and disadvantages. "The analyst must be prepared to evaluate the relative utility--conceptual and methodological--of the various alternatives open to him and to appraise the manifold implications of the level of analysis finally selected."<sup>12</sup>

The implications of a particular level of analysis can be rather far-reaching. A level of analysis, in all likelihood, provides or implies an answer to the question of "where one should look for the actor's sources of conduct."<sup>13</sup> Clearly, the traditional international and national levels of analysis provide implicitly their own answers to the "sources of conduct" question. An international (systemic) orientation or level of analysis "stresses the compulsive attributes of the international system which are regarded as imposing inescapable dispositions upon each actor operating in the system."<sup>14</sup> The national perspective or level of analysis contrarily "stresses the relevance of the complex internal basis of actor activity and the interaction of values, interests, groups, etc. in the process of goal formulation and maximization."<sup>15</sup> Likewise, it is also correct to assume that other less traditional levels of analysis hold similar implications.

The levels of analysis employed by Snyder and Rosenau



in their respective frameworks exhibit what Wolfers would consider as a "swing of the pendulum" away from the traditional approaches. Both theorists appear to reject--in part and in varying degrees--the usual abstract, macro-, state-as-sole-actor approach for the more concrete, micro-focus of the individual. Considering the narrowing of the scope of inquiry from international phenomena as a whole "interaction" to the more specific and restricted field of foreign policy "action," one is perhaps not surprised to find that other levels of analysis and other units of analysis may be required to adequately explicate the "external behavior of states." However, it is incorrect to assume that Snyder and Rosenau make exactly the same commitment to a particular level of analysis.

At the outset Snyder's scheme appears to follow the traditional approach to the question of levels of analysis by focusing on the state. In Snyder's words, the state is conceived "as actor in a situation."<sup>16</sup> His actual level of analysis is clarified by a further distinction. In Snyder's view,

we need to carry the actor-situation scheme one step further in an effort to rid ourselves of the troublesome abstraction "state." It is one of our basic methodological choices to define the state as its official decision-makers--those whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the state. State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers. State as actor is translated into its decision-makers as actors.<sup>17</sup>

The concept of situation, for its part, refers to the fact that decisions are made in an organizational context and are





dependent on how the decision-makers define their situation.<sup>18</sup>

Snyder's "units of analysis" encompass the two elements of situation (organizational context) and the decision-maker.<sup>19</sup> In Snyder's scheme, the decision-maker and the organizational context combine "to establish boundaries which encompass the actors and activities to be observed and explained."<sup>20</sup> Such a unit defining the organizational system within which the decision-making event takes place is the "decisional unit" and is considered Snyder's unit of analysis.

The analytical concept of a "unit of analysis" makes explicit Snyder's level of analysis. Clearly, Snyder's scheme embraces essentially two levels of analysis. Of foremost consideration is his emphasis upon the individual or the psychological level of analysis (decision-maker). In addition, Snyder notes that the decision-maker operates in an organizational context, thus emphasizing the sociological level of analysis. Snyder's scheme of analysis is obviously considerably less abstract than that advocated by Wolfers in his states-as-sole-actor approach.

Compared to Snyder's relatively straightforward levels of analysis, Rosenau's approach to the same question is not only more ambiguous but also considerably more complex. The difficulty in discerning Rosenau's level of analysis appears to center about a rather curious distinction he makes between "levels of analysis" and "philosophies of analysis." Further complications concern the relationship of levels and philosophies of analysis to the question of units of analysis and



his conception of "pre-theories."

At the root of Rosenau's scheme is his notion that advancement of general theory necessitates a similar processing of raw data. What is needed, according to Rosenau, is "pre-theory," which would render raw materials comparable by providing "an early step toward explanation of specific empirical events and a general orientation toward all events."<sup>21</sup> In respect to the usual "pre-theories" employed, it is Rosenau's view that single-cause explanations are unsophisticated and fail to recognize that "causation can be attributed to a variety of actors and entities."<sup>22</sup> This admission would also appear to indicate that Rosenau's units of analysis must also be numerous.

Ordinarily, it would be quite easy to discern the observer's level of analysis from the units of analysis. However, the levels of analysis employed by Rosenau remain obscured, not only by his failure to stipulate his units, as Snyder did, but also by some rather confusing definitive statements. Rosenau states, for example, that by pre-theories "we are not talking about levels of analysis but, in effect, about philosophies of analysis with respect to one particular level, that of national societies."<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, according to Rosenau, "a level of analysis is distinguished by the units of which behavior is explained, whereas a philosophy of analysis pertains to how the units are interrelated at a given level."<sup>24</sup>

Rosenau's distinction between "philosophies" and





"levels" of analysis is perhaps better understood if one recalls that foreign policy analysis is clearly dependent upon the existence of "national societies." Considering the wide-ranging processes involved in the making of foreign policy, Rosenau implies that the national level of abstraction is no longer a sufficient source of explanatory data. However, he recognizes that the legalities of national existence must still be considered. A "philosophy of analysis" apparently is concerned with a general orientation (pre-theory) of how data are related at the legalistic national societies level. The level of analysis, however, is dependent not on legalities but on process and is distinguishable by the units explaining behavior. The difference between an orientation within a legal boundary and an analysis of process appears to be crucial to Rosenau's distinction between "philosophies" and "levels" of analysis.

In Rosenau's view, to formulate a pre-theory one has to assess "relative potencies" by deciding which variables contribute most and which least, and so on, to external behavior. This ranking, which is formulated on the basis of one's philosophy of analysis is, according to Rosenau, a prerequisite to a pre-theory.<sup>25</sup> Ingredients are also necessary. The main ingredients of any pre-theory are either five-dimensional or translatable into five dimensions.<sup>26</sup> These five dimensions are then assessed as to their relative potencies and interrelated with one another at the level of "national societies" according to one's philosophy of analysis. Such



a formulation is known as a pre-theory.

The "ingredient" of a pre-theory appears to be composed of units of analysis. These units, as it was earlier noted, are of a wide variety. The units, however, are classified into "sets of variables" of five dimensions, "in terms of which behavior is explained."<sup>27</sup> Thus the ingredients or "variable clusters" of a pre-theory, in fact, represent Rosenau's levels of analysis.

It is Rosenau's opinion that all foreign policy analysts either analyze the external behavior of national societies in terms of these five variable clusters or in terms of variables which could be easily recast in terms of his five dimensions. For example, according to Rosenau, Singer's two levels of analysis (which Rosenau calls variables)--the international and national systems--could be transformed into his five dimensions.<sup>28</sup> Rosenau's and Singer's levels of analysis are merely the results of choice and represent differing conceptions of the degree of abstraction and comprehensiveness which are necessary to the purpose of the analysis.

Rosenau has formulated a general orientation dependent upon multi-level analysis. A number of degrees of abstraction are represented. "Listed in order of increasing temporal and spatial distance from the external behaviors for which they serve as sources, the five sets are what we shall call the idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal, and systemic variables."<sup>29</sup> Unlike the two levels of analysis represented in Snyder's frame of reference, Rosenau's pre-theory encom-



passes formally, all in the same framework, a number of levels of analysis ranging between the abstraction and comprehensiveness of Wolfers' approach to the concreteness and detail of Snyder's approach.

Returning to the traditional levels of analysis employed particularly demonstrates the difference between the approaches of Snyder and Rosenau. Clearly the latter theorist has combined in a single framework both the international and national perspectives. In his units of analysis Rosenau analytically admits that one must look broadly for the sources of conduct and that both traditional perspectives are essential and indeed, complementary to analysis.<sup>30</sup> Snyder, however, although paying homage to the relevance of the systemic or international level, continues in his frame of reference to analyze international behavior solely in terms of the sub-systemic or individual level.





## Chapter Two

### Dependent and Independent Variables

A structural view of social phenomena consists principally of a theory or perhaps less restrictively of an approach. In any case such an ordered view is sometimes thought to be "composed of identifiable constant factors plus independent and dependent variables, interacting in a dynamic process through which inputs eventually become translated into outputs."<sup>1</sup> In such a structure dependent variables are usually thought of as the "phenomena to be explained," while independent variables are considered "explanatory factors."<sup>2</sup> The following section will discuss Snyder's and Rosenau's dependent and independent variables and other related aspects of their respective approaches.

Logically, it might be assumed that the "phenomena to be explained" or the dependent variables of Rosenau's framework would be the same as those of Snyder's. After all, they are both concerned with the "action focus," or that part of international phenomena known as foreign policy. Such an impression would be generally correct but analytically unsound. Although concerned with foreign policy phenomena Rosenau and Snyder differ as to what precisely is involved in a state's external behavior. Consequently, their dependent variables are quite different.





Earlier it was noted that, according to Snyder, state action, and foreign policy in particular, is the "action taken by those acting in the name of the state" or, in other words, the actions of the decision-makers.<sup>3</sup> Following from the above, one of Snyder's basic choices is to take as a "primary analytical objective" the recreation of the world as the decision-makers view it. The manner in which the decision-makers define situations becomes, in Snyder's view, another way of saying how the state is oriented to action and why.<sup>4</sup> Clearly the key to explanation is determining how the decision-makers define their situation.

Formally, the decision-maker's definition of the situation and the resultant "action" are individually "a part of" and "subject to" a decision. A particular action occurs as a result of a formal decision and the decision itself is dependent upon one's definition of the situation. Actually, to Snyder a decision implies action and for the most part the two terms are interchangeable.<sup>5</sup>

Apparently, Snyder views an explanation of the decision as the equivalent of an explanation of foreign policy itself. Indeed, it is Snyder's opinion that although decision-making (the process of making a decision) is not all of international relations it is more than foreign policy.<sup>6</sup> Decisions, in Snyder's view,

refer to choices between or among alternative courses of action by a decisional unit. Narrowly conceived, decision theory might refer to choice of alternatives, but we prefer to include the search for alternatives, and even the decision as to what problems will be dealt with, as well as choice and execution.<sup>7</sup>



Decision-making is considered more than foreign policy, primarily because it concentrates on the media and processes by which decisions are formulated. Only through an analysis of the determinants of a decision are the "why" questions underlying state action explicated.<sup>8</sup> Clearly, the dependent variable of Snyder's analysis is the foreign policy "decision."

Rosenau's article "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" is primarily concerned with the development of a general theory which will account for the external behavior of national societies. He is particularly concerned that the foreign policy field "has an abundance of frameworks and approaches which cut across societies and conceptualize the ends, means, capabilities, or sources of foreign policy but no schemes which link up these components of external behavior in causal sequences."<sup>9</sup> Rosenau's aim in this article is to make the philosophical and conceptual adjustments which he believes are necessary to overcoming the current lack of a general theory. Throughout the article Rosenau is primarily concerned with stipulating independent variables or "explanatory factors," indicating their relationships and the criteria for their application, and formulating new conceptualizations which presumably will aid the development of general theory. The dependent variable or "phenomena to be explained" by these variables is stated simply as the "external behavior of societies."

Only recently has Rosenau become explicit about what is meant precisely by "external behavior."<sup>10</sup> Rosenau begins





by stating that "the core of any hypothesis about human phenomena is the behavior that the researcher is seeking to comprehend and that is predicted to undergo change as conditions vary."<sup>11</sup> This behavior constitutes the dependent variable of the researcher's hypothesis. Rosenau feels, however, that if this behavior is too narrowly conceived observation and measurement will yield findings that provide only partial answers to the questions being asked. Contrarily, neither should behavior be so broadly conceived that the variations observed become so gross that researcher's questions are rendered unanswerable.

Rosenau's view is that Snyder's conception of "decision" as his dependent variable represents the former difficulty. An analysis of "decisions" as the "phenomena to be explained," in Rosenau's opinion, results in only a partial answer. In his view,

[i]t seems insufficient to describe foreign policy solely in decisional terms. The central unit of action is too multi-dimensional to be seen as merely a choice that officials make among conflicting alternatives. By the time officials have mobilized resources in support of their decisions and coped with the responses of those toward whom the decisions are directed decision-making is no longer enough to describe the action in which the analyst is interested. For officials to translate the stimuli to external behavior into behavior intended to be effective requires a vast undertaking that encompasses many decisions by many people.<sup>12</sup>

Rosenau's conception of external behavior is considerably broader in scope than Snyder's "decision" as dependent variable.

Rosenau refers to foreign policy "undertakings" as



his dependent variable.<sup>13</sup> "An undertaking is conceived to be a course of action that the duly constituted officials of a national society pursue in order to preserve or alter a situation in the international system in such a way that it is consistent with goals decided upon by them or their predecessors."<sup>14</sup> The distinctive feature about such a formulation is that it is concerned with implementation or, as Rosenau has called it, the "responsive stage."<sup>15</sup> As an analytic tool the undertaking focuses primarily on what government does, not on how it decides to do it. Such a formulation can presumably handle the sequential behavior of foreign policy that decisions are unable to and also cope with the "feedback" which returns to the undertaking as the foreign policy or undertaking is unfolding. Flexibility in examining the "responsive stage" is deemed particularly important by Rosenau in providing full and complete answers to the questions being asked.

"Logically an infinite number of factors can be treated as independent variables."<sup>16</sup> Both Snyder and Rosenau recognize that foreign policy is dependent upon a number of factors. Fortunately, Rosenau and Snyder make considerable effort to categorize and organize the "explanatory factors" considered significant in their analysis. In this respect, the independent variables of Rosenau's "pre-theory" is considerably clearer than those variables stipulated in Snyder's "frame of reference." Furthermore, the two schemes differ considerably in the criteria upon which independent variables become more or less significant in respect to dependent vari-





ables. The following will indicate the independent variables of each framework.<sup>17</sup>

Rosenau has indicated that the development of general theory is inhibited by two shortcomings--one philosophical and the other conceptual. The philosophical problem is tied to his notion that raw materials must be similarly processed. Conceptual problems relate to Rosenau's evidence that a "new kind of political system, the penetrated system, is needed to comprehend the fusion of national and international systems in certain kinds of issue areas."<sup>18</sup> Both these shortcomings are related to Rosenau's delineation of independent variables.

To repeat, by pre-theory Rosenau means "both an early step toward explanation of specific empirical events and a general orientation toward all events."<sup>19</sup> The ingredients of Rosenau's pre-theory are his main independent variables. Foreign policy, or specifically an "undertaking," can be explained in terms of five sets of variables--idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal, and systemic.<sup>20</sup> These variable clusters constitute "explanatory factors" and as such are independent variables.

In addition to the above factors, Rosenau notes other "confounding variables" which affect the external behavior of national societies. Thinking in terms of the usual national-international distinction can no longer, in Rosenau's view, be maintained in the face of mounting evidence. Non-members of a national political system often participate directly and authoritatively in the allocation of values of that national



political system.<sup>21</sup> It is also evident that the functioning of any political system varies significantly from one "issue" to another. According to Rosenau, data would appear to indicate that "different types of issue-areas elicit different sets of motives on the part of different actors in a political system and that different system members are thus activated in different issue-areas."<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, it should also be noted that, "[b]oth within and outside the society that initiates a foreign policy undertaking, events occur or situations emerge as it unfolds that are sufficiently potent to feed back into the undertaking as determinants of its future course."<sup>23</sup> These independent variables which confound an analysis using the five major variable clusters will be further considered in Chapter Four.

Unlike Rosenau's explicit delineation of "explanatory factors," Snyder's independent variables are considerably less clearly organized and categorized. Basic to Snyder's "frame of reference" is his intention to recreate the world of the decision-makers as they view it. To reiterate, Snyder sees "decisions" and foreign policy action as dependent broadly upon a chain of factors relating the decision-maker and the situation. The decision-maker is seen to operate in an organizational context known as the "decisional unit." The decisional unit is viewed as functioning in an internal and external setting.<sup>24</sup> Within the decisional unit the decision-making process evolves a "definition of the situation" which, in turn, evokes a particular decision.





The key element in the above overview is the decisional unit. What is required is a consideration of all factors which influence the results of deliberations within the decisional unit. In Snyder's opinion, the major explanatory factors are encompassed analytically in the variable clusters known as sphere of competence, communication and information, and motivation.<sup>25</sup> An analysis involving these determinants of decision-making involves both the decision-maker and the system (organizational structure and process) perspective and in Rosenau's view accounts for all factors influencing a foreign policy decision.<sup>26</sup>

The above sets of variables, although considered distinct categories, are all closely interconnected. However, for comparative purposes it may be useful to examine them in terms of organizational-factors (spheres of competence, communication and information) and individualistic decision-making factors (motivation).

"Spheres of competence" and "communication and information" as explanatory factors are rather cursorily examined. Snyder's contention with respect to "competence" involves the rather simplistic view that decision-making choice is dependent not only on how the particular decision-maker's role or competency is specified but also upon the degree of discretionary behavior permitted within a particular organizational structure.<sup>27</sup> Likewise, "communication and information" is also regarded as a significant set of independent variables, particularly in supplying two essential kinds of information--





about the setting of the unit and in respect to "feedbacks" regarding the consequences of projects already underway.<sup>28</sup>

The above sets of variables are connected to Snyder's main set of independent variables--motivation. Although Snyder is quick to point out that motivational analysis involves only one component of action, it is clear that he considers motivation the most important set of variables.<sup>29</sup> The concept of motivation serves as a key synthesizing device covering such individualistic factors as personality, values, learning and attitudes.<sup>30</sup> The study of motivation, according to Snyder, provides the foundation for conceptually linking the setting and the decisional unit. "Motivation refers to a psychological state of the actor in which energy is mobilized and selectively directed toward the setting."<sup>31</sup> Only by examining the motivational factors which undergird action is it possible to probe the "why" of state behavior.

Understanding the "why" of state behavior or, as Snyder views it, the behavior of the decision-makers, involves many facets. Snyder's conception of motivation requires a complex, multidimensional relationship between a number of factors and components. Analytically, "attitudes" and "frames of reference" constitute the main divisions of motivational analysis. Attitudes refer to the readiness of individual decision-makers to be motivated, or in other words, "a generalized readiness to respond in certain ways to stimuli."<sup>32</sup> Specific responses, however, are determined by the decision-maker's "frame of reference." The "frame of reference" is



the main focus of motivation.

A "frame of reference" involves the analytical components: perception, valuation and evaluation;<sup>33</sup> these three components constitute the "core" of motivation.

Being motivated means that the individual's energy and attention are selectively directed. Motive determines what one selects in perceiving and how one organizes and uses it.<sup>34</sup>

"Perception" refers to the selective aspect of motivation.

"Valuation" involves organizing one's perceptions in respect to values and standards. Essentially, valuation is "behavior directed toward the establishment of preferences: it involves discriminating, rejecting, or 'caring about' certain elements of the situation."<sup>35</sup> Valuation also includes development (based on selective perception and values) of preferred paths or strategies which direct specific acts toward the objectives chosen. "Evaluation" refers to the appraisal of the relationship between the specified acts and the objective envisaged. Together, the combination of these components can be regarded as encompassing the essence of decision-making--thinking, or problem solving.

Snyder suggests "some of the basic kinds of data from which motivation must be inferred."<sup>36</sup> A primary source of motivational data is personality. In Snyder's framework personality is examined as a source of motivational data almost exclusively in the sociological or socio-psychological sense. Personality is used to bridge the gap between those parts of the scheme based on the individual actor (decision-maker) and





those parts based on system or structure (organization).<sup>37</sup> Behavior could be explained in terms of the group or organizational situation (sociological), or it could be explained entirely in terms of "ego-oriented" needs and tensions (psychological-idiosyncratic).<sup>38</sup> Snyder apparently chooses to analyze the "why" of behavior in socio-psychological terms. Personality he examined primarily in terms of the individual decision-maker in an organizational context. Only if the assumption that personality is shaped by the decision-maker's interaction with actors and by his place in the organization fails to account for motivation will Snyder consider idiosyncratic factors as an aspect to be examined in his analysis.<sup>39</sup> By the above approach Snyder hopes to isolate explicitly or minimize the idiosyncratic element in the motivational analysis of decision-making.

Clearly, Snyder's and Rosenau's approaches contain different dependent and independent variables. However to identify the independent variables actively influencing the foreign policy "decisions" or "undertakings" is not to indicate which variables are the strongest and most significant to explanation. An orientation, or in Rosenau's terminology, a pre-theory, is necessary to specify the strength of variables under varying conditions. Broadly it is perhaps possible to specify such an orientation as either phenomenological or non-phenomenological in nature. The more philosophical aspects of Rosenau's and Snyder's frameworks will be discussed in the following chapter.





### Chapter Three

#### Phenomenological Issue

A major difference between the approaches of Snyder and Rosenau seems to coalesce around a crucial issue in the social sciences--the phenomenological issue. The dilemma appears to be this: "Do we examine our actor's behavior in terms of the objective factors which allegedly influence that behavior or do we do so in terms of the actor's perception of these 'objective factors'?"<sup>1</sup> J. David Singer has indicated that, although the phenomenological and non-phenomenological "approaches are not completely exclusive of one another, they proceed from greatly different and often incompatible assumptions, and produce markedly divergent models of rational behavior."<sup>2</sup> An examination of the underlying assumptions implicit in the phenomenological approach in respect to Snyder and Rosenau may prove helpful in explicating the differences between their approaches.

In particular, the acceptance or rejection of the phenomenological approach appears to revolve around one major question and three related queries.<sup>3</sup> The major question involves that of social causation--whether individuals and groups respond in a quasi-deterministic fashion to the physical environment, or whether they are influenced by these factors only in so far as these objective forces are perceived and



evaluated by individuals or groups. Other subsidiary questions appear to be logical extensions of the above main issue. Specifically, can explanation logically omit reference to the processes or media by which "external conditions and factors are translated into a policy decision?" Secondly, an obviously related question would inquire whether or not the decisional media are susceptible to empirical and systematic observation. The third and final related question concerns who or what it is that one studies. Specifically, is the state a distinct social entity or is it an "agglomeration of individuals, institutions, customs, and procedures"?<sup>4</sup> These important questions underlying the theorist's approach will be considered in the following paragraphs.

Questions concerning the nature of causation appear to be integral to the relationship between foreign policy "action" ("undertakings" or "decisions") and the environment. Regarded as nearly universal is the practice of "explaining past events and predicting future trends in the patterns of international politics by reference to some set of environmental factors."<sup>5</sup> The previous section indicated a number of "environmental factors" as independent variables in the study of foreign policy. Environmental relationships, it was noted, however, may be expressed in a number of ways. Although environmental relationships are inherent in any discussion of human affairs, it is important to realize that one's conception of such relationships and modes of analyzing them are likely to vary considerably.<sup>6</sup>





Snyder's and Rosenau's conceptions of causation, particularly in respect to environmental relationships, appear roughly the same. Snyder indicates that the analysis of causation involves "three overlapping environments." In his view, foreign policy "necessarily mediates among internal and external demands and needs and among decision-makers themselves."<sup>7</sup> Rosenau hypothesizes similar sorts of considerations in delineating his five sets of variables. In Rosenau's opinion these variables reflect the same considerations or causal factors as Snyder's "three environments." In fact, Rosenau would suggest that Snyder's environments are reducible to consideration in terms of his five dimensions or sets of variables.<sup>8</sup> For example, Rosenau's "role" variables and "governmental" variables are similar to Snyder's "organizational context" or setting. Likewise, the "external setting" is reducible to Rosenau's "systemic" variables and the "internal setting" considered in terms of "societal" variables. Furthermore, a correlation also exists (in part) between "idiosyncratic" variables and Snyder's "decision-maker."

While Rosenau and Snyder may exhibit similarities in their conception of causal relationships between variable clusters, their modes of analyzing these relationships are significantly dissimilar. The above similarities are significant only apart from their respective modes of analysis. The analytical frameworks of Rosenau and Snyder exhibit differing modes of analyzing environmental relationships. One of these modes of analysis is the phenomenological approach.





The foregoing section (discussing variables) illustrated Snyder's dependence upon the actor's "perception" of objective factors. Snyder has made it quite clear that it is a basic analytical objective of his approach to recreate the world as the state's decision-makers view it. In his words, "this is a quite different approach from trying to recreate the situation and interpretation of it objectively, that is, by the observer's judgment rather than that of the actors themselves."<sup>9</sup> The whole of Snyder's approach is centered around analyzing the behavior of the decision-makers and their subjective relationship to external phenomena. In Snyder's view, for example, the "external setting is constantly changing and will be composed of what the decision decision-makers decide is important."<sup>10</sup> In short, it is Snyder's view that the study of foreign policy or "decision-making needs a phenomenological approach."<sup>11</sup>

Rosenau contrarily appears to place a high regard on objective forces or stimuli. Factors are considered more or less causal, depending on the perception of decision-makers. Environmental factors are considered relevant and significant to behavior on the basis of objective criteria. The impact of variables are determined by the status of the entity being analysed with respect to placement in the following categories: developed or underdeveloped country, large or small country, and open or closed society.<sup>12</sup> The particular horizontal system (international, penetrated, or national) in which a particular issue-area or vertical system (territorial, status,



human resources, non-human resources) is operative also functions in Rosenau's approach to determine the significance and strength of causal factors.<sup>13</sup> The relevance of suspected factors is not determined by analysis undertaken by looking through the eyes of the decision-makers. Rather in Rosenau's approach the objective factors of the environment are the major sources of direct attention.

Only under certain stipulated conditions do the decision-makers themselves assume a primary place in causal analysis.<sup>14</sup> Such an occurrence, however, does not necessitate a complete motivational analysis of the individual. The occurrence of a "Snyder type" motivational analysis, however, is not out of the question. Idiosyncratic factors, according to Rosenau, include those aspects of a decision-maker "that distinguish his foreign policy choices or behavior from those of every other decision-maker."<sup>15</sup> Motivational analysis including an analysis of the decision-maker's perception could be included in Rosenau's idiosyncratic variables. Such an analysis, in Rosenau's framework, would occur seldom (if at all), depending on the objective criteria mentioned above. Such analysis undoubtedly would not attempt to recreate the entire world as the decision-makers view it. Unlike Snyder's approach, Rosenau's assumption is that individuals do not constitute the state and are considered "important participants in and contributors to state action," not the essence of state action itself.

The frameworks of Snyder and Rosenau imply a number





of divergencies in respect to their notions of social causation. Rosenau's dependence upon objective indicators of causation is definitely opposed to Snyder's commitment to analysis of causal factors only in so far as they are perceived and evaluated by decision-makers. Rosenau's position appears to attribute considerably more impact to the physical environment apart from the perception of decision-makers than does Snyder's. Rosenau's major causal factors consist (as it was earlier noted) primarily of non-human factors objectively evident to the observer, irrespective of the perception of the decision-makers. Snyder, however, considers all factors causal only in so far as they are discerned by the key decision-makers. In Snyder's model the behavior of individuals is influenced not by objective factors but by how these forces are perceived and evaluated. Forces that are discerned by the decision-maker (except organizational forces) do not exist for Snyder, and those that do exist do so only in the fashion in which they are perceived. Unlike Rosenau, the only reality, in Snyder's opinion, is the phenomenal.

Although the researcher's view of social causation is a major consideration, one's predisposition for the phenomenological approach is affected by other factors. For example, it is difficult to imagine a phenomenological approach which does not stress the individual as the primary unit of analysis. How would the researcher examine the perceptions and evaluations necessary to the phenomenological approach if the state were not seen as composed of real people or individuals? After





all, only people are capable of perceptions, experience and expectations.

Earlier it was noted that Snyder and Rosenau use different units of analysis in their approaches. Snyder specifies the individual decision-maker or decision unit as his unit of analysis. Rosenau, on the other hand however, depends upon a number and variety of units of analysis. Occasionally Rosenau does stress the individual in his analysis but only under particular circumstances and in a limited sense (as noted above). Unlike Snyder's approach Rosenau's framework does not seem particularly suited to a phenomenological approach.

The respective frameworks of Snyder and Rosenau exhibit other differences directly tied to the phenomenological issue. Perhaps it is not surprising that the two approaches exhibit differing conceptions of the nature of explanation in the social sciences. However, the question of explanation is almost impossible to divorce from the more practical question relating to the empirical feasibility of pursuing an explanation based on a phenomenological approach. The following statement by a supporter of the Rosenau approach illustrates the interconnection of these questions.

A state's foreign policy is the product of an often protracted decision-making process involving considerations of objectives and instruments as well as domestic and foreign support and opposition. The perceptions and motives of the responsible decision-makers are usually thought to be the final causes of foreign policy outputs by those who hold this viewpoint. However, the tracing of these perceptions is a notoriously difficult task because of the problems of access and reliability. An alternative approach is to assume that social forces are operative



regardless of the human actor's awareness, and that a satisfactory explanation need not include every link in the causal chain.<sup>16</sup>

Rosenau apparently is not impressed by the argument that explanation must include the cognitive and perceptual linkage between external forces and the media translating such forces into policy decisions. He does not ignore the fact that "stimuli producing external behavior must be processed by the value and decision-making systems of a society."<sup>17</sup> He simply states "that it ought to be possible, as with rats in a maze, to link up varying types of responses with varying types of stimuli."<sup>18</sup> Rosenau's approach to explanation is perhaps not unlike that of the S-R, learning theorists in psychology. Explanation, in his view, can be handled satisfactorily and efficiently without a particularly elaborate analysis of the decisional media translating stimuli into foreign policy behavior.

The observer, in Rosenau's opinion, should concentrate on linking external and internal factors to the behavior of societies. It is Rosenau's feeling that Snyder passed too quickly over the domestic and foreign sources of motivation.<sup>19</sup> Snyder "did not enumerate any of the factors in the internal and external settings to which decision-makers might respond." They were postulated as significant but Snyder did not specify any instances or occasions indicating "how" or "what" external and internal factors were important. The linkage was not provided. Only the perceptions of the decision-maker provide a clue to the internal and external factor relevance or irrele-





vance. According to Rosenau,

processes located in the environment toward which officials direct their decisions are no less relevant than those which occur in their minds and interactions. To reconstruct the world from the perspective of the decision-maker, the researcher must examine the world itself in order to comprehend the dynamics and limits of the decision-maker's perspective.<sup>20</sup>

Decisional phenomena viewed from a phenomenological perspective cannot themselves provide, in Rosenau's opinion, a satisfactory explanation for external behavior.

Rosenau's approach to explanation appears to be in two dimensions. Unlike Snyder, Rosenau desires to narrow or reduce the importance of the "decisional media" in accounting for external behavior and to broaden the impact of external and internal factors. He appears to advocate the "golden mean" between explanations on non-human forces and the impact of individuals. In his own terminology, Rosenau emphasizes explanation in terms of all three stages of foreign policy development: initiatory, implementive, and responsive stages.<sup>21</sup> Snyder, however, appears primarily interested in the "implementive stage" of analysis. Within the "implementive stage" it is feasible to use the phenomenological approach. The other two stages, however, require a non-phenomenological approach. To examine the "responsive stage" of foreign policy through the decision maker's eyes would omit a great amount of foreign policy data. Thus Rosenau can be seen as advocating both a narrowing of the scope of inquiry (in respect to the decisional media) and at the same time broadening explan-





ation (in terms of the "responsive stage" and factors external to the decisional media).

Underlying Rosenau's approach to explanation appears to be the implicit assumption that satisfactory explanation does not necessitate tracing and accounting for the whole of reality. Rosenau's opinion would seem to follow Singer's statement that "one is by no means required to trace every perception, transmission and receipt between stimulus and response or input and output in order to explain the behavior of the nation or any other human group."<sup>22</sup> Implicit in Rosenau's approach is the view that tracing the perceptions of decision-makers is an exceedingly difficult task. Although he suggests that phenomenological analysis is difficult, Rosenau's main objection seems to center about the restricted scope and utility of the phenomenological perspective. The kind of data which interests Rosenau and is, in his view, useful may be obtained without recourse to the phenomenological perspective and the problems and difficulties which accompany such an approach.

Snyder, contrarily, would disagree both with Rosenau's conception of explanation and with his judgment in respect to the feasibility and utility of the phenomenological approach. In Snyder's opinion, explanation in the social sciences and particularly foreign policy must be concerned specifically with questions which he considers of a "why" variety. To date, researchers have, he states, concentrated on "how" or "what" questions and neglected the crucial "why" queries.



Explanation, to Snyder, must answer the "why" questions. To repeat, only through decision-making analysis which attempts to re-create the world from the perspective of key individuals can these 'why' questions be satisfactorily explicated.<sup>23</sup>

Although it is in Snyder's view unnecessary that all useful work must or can be done within the decision-making framework, explanation as he envisions it must include decision-making analysis.

Analysis based on a phenomenological perspective is, according to Snyder, possible. Although he admits that they (those who advocate decision-making analysis) are a long way from a hard methodology incorporating the phenomenological perspective, he has "faith that such a methodology is possible."<sup>24</sup> This commitment is important. However, the key element remains, in Snyder's view, that commitment to the phenomenological approach is crucial to explanation. Without a phenomenological perspective explanation remains incomplete and only partial.

Rosenau and Snyder exhibit differing views regarding the utility of the phenomenological perspective. Snyder's "frame of reference" clearly accepts the phenomenological mode of analysis while Rosenau's "pre-theory" does not. Such a difference in analysis is crucial. Analysis of a phenomenological nature would appear to depend on the researcher's ability to gather detailed empirical data. Unfortunately, as the next chapter illustrates, such data is often difficult, if not impossible to gather.





## Chapter Four

### Operationalization

Although Rosenau and Snyder have formulated "approaches" to the analysis of foreign policy and not "theories," in the technical sense of the term, the question remains as to the relative utility of these approaches in dealing with empirical data. Doubts, for example, have been raised concerning the feasibility of "operationalizing" their respective frameworks. Even in an approach to analysis "operationalization" is a crucial question. The main function of an approach, as it was noted earlier, is in the establishment of categories. Clearly, as Snyder emphasizes, "operations which facilitate the recognition of phenomena to be observed and explained, as well as the ordering of countless individual instances via carefully constructed categories, are necessary to theorizing."<sup>1</sup> A key question in comparing the two approaches would appear to involve whether Rosenau's or Snyder's approach is more applicable to empirical data.

Both Snyder and Rosenau are optimistic that their approaches will lead ultimately to the development of empirical theory. One must, however, ask whether this expectation will in fact occur. Is it logically and empirically possible for theory to result from the approaches as they now appear to be formulated? Or, as Modelski has suggested, "granted that it is a possible way of organizing knowledge about foreign policy





is it the most propitious way of doing so"?<sup>2</sup> The above illustrate questions connected with and dependent upon the operationalization of the two approaches.

A number of scholars apparently have serious doubts concerning the "possibility" and "propitiousness" of operationalizing the approaches of Snyder and Rosenau. The decision-making approach particularly has been subjected to harsh criticism. Rosenau's approach, however, has not undergone the same torrent of criticism that accompanied the decision-making approach. Presently, it is not clear whether the apparent current enthusiasm for Rosenau's approach is primarily the result of the operational utility of the scheme or is a function rather of the relatively recent origins of the approach. Perhaps, in time, and under closer examination, Rosenau's approach will face criticism of the same magnitude and force that have descended upon decision-making.

Nevertheless, more work is needed. Questions involving operationalization are difficult to answer, for such queries obviously involve empirical data and are dependent upon empirical testing. To say that one approach is more readily operationalizable depends upon the framework's usefulness in dealing with empirical data. Operationalization is dependent upon empirical application. Unfortunately, to this date, little empirical work of this essential nature has been compiled.

Although operational attempts of a partial nature are evident in the literature, essentially Snyder and Paige's



analysis of the 1950 "United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea" remains the only full scale, general empirical attempt to operationalize either of the two schemes.<sup>3</sup> Snyder's and Paige's attempted application is particularly useful in comparing the two approaches. The empirical application of the decision-making approach emphasizes the difficulties inherent in Snyder's approach--difficulties which Rosenau apparently hoped to avoid in his own scheme. At the same time, Snyder and Paige's empirical application provides a valuable source of data to which Rosenau's own framework may be applied and at least partially tested as to its operational utility. This contributes a further basis of comparison.

In addition to learning about a particular decision, Snyder's primary objective in analyzing the 1950 Korea decision was to test the fruitfulness of his generalized conceptual scheme. Specifically, Snyder expected his framework to answer two basic questions:

Why was there a decision at all in this situation?  
Why was this decision made in response to the North Korean attack instead of some other?<sup>4</sup>

According to Snyder, description (what happened and how it happened) is alone incapable of answering these questions. "Unless an observer brings in explanatory apparatus to his data, the facts, descriptive propositions will not 'speak for themselves' or suggest answers to certain 'why' questions."<sup>5</sup> He is hopeful that the decision-making framework will provide the conceptual apparatus to answer the above "why" questions.





Earlier the various elements (dependent and independent variables) and the general complexity of the decision-making approach was noted. Suffice it to repeat that the framework is conceived as interdisciplinary and employs a combination of psychological and sociological variables. The decision-making perspective consists of an analysis of intellectual and organizational processes. These processes are represented analytically by the three variables--spheres of competence, communication and information, and motivation--which indicate what kinds of data are to be collected in the analysis of a decision. Essentially, it is the collection of data indicated by these three variables which is crucial to the framework and its operationalization. In Snyder's opinion, if a significant number of activities and factual propositions about these variables can be established, "the interrelation of the three sets of propositions becomes the empirical foundation for an explanation of a decision."<sup>6</sup>

Unfortunately, Snyder and Paige do not appear particularly careful in analyzing the Korean decision with respect to the three variables which Snyder earlier deemed crucial. Rather they tend to depend heavily on other concepts of a broader analytical scope which tend to overlap the boundaries of the three main variables. In their analysis of the Korean decision Snyder and Paige depend primarily on the concept of "definition of the situation." Additionally, essentially for descriptive, integrative and clarifying purposes, they make considerable use of the concept "process" (intel-





lectual and organizational). Between these two concepts Snyder apparently hoped to account for all of the data necessary to explicate the Korean decision.

Presumably, the explicated decision should include data of an organizational, information and communication, and motivational nature; particularly if the empirical application is to be considered an adequate test of the decision-making framework. Such a breakdown, however, is not readily apparent from Snyder's empirical application. Generally, analysis of the Korean decision is much more superficial than the earlier (1954) theoretical article indicated. A discussion of Snyder's empirical application of his key motivational variable cluster should make this superficiality abundantly clear.

Rather than a careful analysis of motivation in the complex terms of his earlier framework, Snyder apparently turned to "definition of the situation" and its operationalization to provide his analysis with the needed motivational data. Essentially, definition of the situation is considered the result of the "intellectual process."<sup>7</sup> The major function of the definition of the situation is that it is intended to clarify "the empirical components of the 'intellectual process' of decision."<sup>8</sup> Five component elements of definition of the situation were stipulated which Snyder and Paige believed would make the concept into a useful tool for organizing and interpreting data. Definition of the situation includes the following categories and operations:



(1) categorization of an event in terms of past experience and existing "givens"; (2) specification and clarification of generalized values and the bearing of the objective situation on them; (3) perceived relevancies--factual aspects "added to" the objective situation; (4) establishment of a set of goals--a desired set of affairs to be attained; and (5) assessment and selection of one combination of available means and desired goals.<sup>9</sup>

Within these categories is contained the motivational data which is important in transforming inner projection into an act.

Unfortunately, such a breakdown seems not to provide the explicit tools or direction necessary to collecting the required data. For the most part, the component elements of the operationalized definition of the situation are merely stipulated. Little attempt is made to gather the relevant data in any depth or sophistication or to correlate it with the stated independent "variable clusters" such as motivation. For example, although the "categorizing of an event in terms of past experience and existing givens" is an important aspect of analysis, particularly motivational analysis, the empirical referents of such data are rather general and superficial. The Korean situation evoked the following "data" in terms of past experience of the decision-makers:

For them, the violation of a frontier by organized military forces was clearly another example of the aggressions of the 1930's. To them, also, the 'lesson of history' was unmistakable: unchecked aggression eventually leads to world war.<sup>10</sup>

As a key aspect of motivation such an analysis is not very penetrating.

As a major analytical construct or "variable cluster,"





motivation was intended to synthesize such aspects of behavior as personality, perception, values, and attitudes in empirical analysis.<sup>11</sup> Unfortunately, Snyder and Paige's "empirical application" illustrates the difficulty of such an ambitious approach. A major consequence has been curtailing the scope of motivational analysis. Snyder's and Paige's attempt at an empirical application of the framework indicated that considerable reformulation of the variables is necessary to the successful operationalization of the approach.

What appears to have occurred in the empirical application is that a consideration of values has been largely substituted for Snyder's broader concern for motivation. In his own analysis of the Korean decision Paige indicates such a shift in emphasis. He states that "in the present study I have found it most useful to conceive of motives as values (desired states of affairs plus desired means for achieving them) and to limit analysis to those explicitly expressed."<sup>12</sup> Together, Snyder and Paige exhibit a similar inclination in their own discussion of the Korean situation. According to their empirical application, values are the key or primary element in an "intellectual process" analysis. In Snyder and Paige's view,

[a] decision results from the relating of values and situation with attitudes, perception, and information serving a two-way mediating function. In this process values are clarified; the question of what values are threatened by an event or events is raised and answered.<sup>13</sup>

Prediction of decision-making behavior cannot be made on the





basis of values alone. Values must be "operationalized" in terms of the situation confronting the actor; that is, objective properties of the situation (information) and the relevancies surrounding it (perception) must be determined.<sup>14</sup>

The Korean situation, Snyder and Paige point out, was primarily a value decision. The rather clear-cut values involved (plus the circumstances) apparently overrode other considerations. "The decision-makers felt that the values to be served by intervening militarily outweighed any potential cost. It was, to put it another way, a blank-check decision."<sup>15</sup> Such a "value-cost" consideration appears in the empirical analysis as sufficient motive for the decision.

The foregoing indicated that Snyder's categories and variables were not as receptive to empirical data as they should be for adequate operationalization. Conceptual modifications were in some cases made.<sup>16</sup> The framework continues to need considerable adjustment, particularly in developing more clearly defined categories and variables capable of operationalization.

Another aspect of the same problem of operationalization should also be considered. It is impossible to ignore the fact that data necessary for the framework's operation is difficult, if not in many cases impossible, to collect. Snyder's framework necessitates that, prior to analysis proper, the researcher must "assume that the decision-makers have been identified and that the organizational unit has been determined."<sup>17</sup> J. Frankel, however, has indicated that even



where the action is relatively simple "the actual locus of decision-making cannot always be determined."<sup>18</sup> The establishment of the identity of the decision-makers and the make-up of the decisional unit is a necessary condition in operationalizing the decision-making approach.

Undoubtedly, the Korean situation exhibited conditions that were distinctly favorable to the empirical application of the decision-making scheme. In the first place, the initial prerequisites of analysis were satisfied--the decision-makers and the decisional unit (organization) were identifiable and accessible to the analyst. Furthermore, the decisional period itself was of a short duration, involved relatively few people, and was considered by those involved to be of major importance. In other words, the Korean decision was an ex post facto crisis decision in which few alternatives were considered, and little conflicting information was evident among the limited information. Considering the straightforward values at stake and the situation itself, one can quite easily understand why a decision was made in this case. If the framework was to prove at all applicable to empirical data the Korean decision presented a convenient and relatively straightforward set of data.

In addition to the difficulties experienced in respect to the accessibility to data and ability to organize the data, scholars also exhibit qualms regarding the "sufficiency" of the approach. Although some theorists may not quarrel particularly with the technical feasibility of operationalizing





the decision-making framework, they may question the fruitfulness and ability of such an approach in accounting for the whole of foreign policy. Y. Modelski, for example, notes that an undue emphasis on decision-making leads to what he calls the "genetic fallacy" in assuming that an account of the origins (initiatory stage) of a policy adequately explains the entire policy.<sup>19</sup> Further, decision-making may neglect the impact of the international context which "conditions the behavior of the units."<sup>20</sup> Rosenau, as it was noted earlier, expands the notion of external influence to emphasize all external factors outside of the decisional organization. In his opinion,

to theorize about the decisions that officials are likely to make, one must have some notion of the nature of the stimuli to which they are exposed. Variables within the decision-making organization may be crucial, but they are variables, and events or trends outside the organization are key determinants of the way in which they vary.<sup>21</sup>

Thus a central concern of many scholars is decision-making's insufficiently broad analytical scope.

Rosenau appears to be simultaneously concerned with both the technical feasibility of operationalizing Snyder's approach and the apparent "insufficiency" of the approach. These difficulties together are encompassed in Rosenau's often repeated criticism of Snyder's framework concerning the scheme's "lack of empirical application."<sup>22</sup> As stimulating as Snyder's scheme was, Rosenau's original enthusiasm for the approach apparently abated as the approach failed, in his opinion, to arouse widespread attempts at conceptual modifi-





cation or empirical validation. "Thought was provoked and decisional phenomena came to be emphasized, but the approach itself remain[ed] unamplified."<sup>23</sup>

For one as concerned with the development of general empirical theory and research as Rosenau was, the difficulty in empirically applying Snyder's approach was intolerable and denoted considerable problems in the framework and the approach itself. Undoubtedly these difficulties (and the advantages) inherent in the decision-making approach considerably influenced Rosenau's own general framework.<sup>24</sup> Many of the differences between the two approaches have been examined in earlier sections. It remains an open question, however, whether Rosenau's framework itself is, in fact, more susceptible to empirical application than Snyder's approach.

In respect to the above question, a few a priori, speculative comments at this time may not be out of order. It could be assumed that Rosenau's non-phenomenological orientation immediately places him beyond one of Snyder's most vexing obstacles to operationalization--the requirement to recreate the world as the decision-maker views it and the resultant problem of accessibility. The observer's perspective (non-phenomenological) further allows Rosenau to view as objectively as possible the wide range of inputs and activities involved in producing foreign policy action or output. As a consequence of his diverse and generally higher level of analysis, Rosenau is able to concentrate in a comprehensive manner on the whole of foreign policy phenomena rather than to



examine in detail only a part of the field. Generally, the data necessary for Rosenau's analysis seems considerably less complicated to gather and to categorize than the data necessary to operationalize Snyder's decisional framework. Whether such speculation accords with the facts is of course dependent upon empirical application or testing.

"The authoritative efforts of a national society to maintain control over its external environment through the preservation of desired situations abroad and the modification of undesired ones"<sup>25</sup> or, as stated elsewhere, "calculated control"<sup>26</sup> should be viewed, in Rosenau's opinion, as the central concern of foreign policy. The Korean situation presented the United States with events which required authoritative action calculated to control and modify what was conceived to be an undesirable situation. Uncovering and understanding the American response or the "undertaking" (as the dependent variable was earlier identified) requires a consideration of a number of variables.

Applying Rosenau's framework to the Korean situation demonstrates Rosenau's concern for a broad scope of analysis. According to Snyder and Paige's analysis, the time period covering the Korean situation is easily broken down into three periods--"predecisional" (prior to 3 P.M., E.D.T., Saturday, June 24, 1950), "decisional" (3 P.M., Saturday, June 24 to 12 noon, Friday, June 30) and "postdecisional" (after 12 noon, June 30, 1950).<sup>27</sup> Following from his phenomenological orientation and his view that "decisions" constitute the dependent



variable of analysis, Snyder maintains that in his analysis "we do not attempt to report or account for events not in the decisional period."<sup>28</sup> Rosenau, however, seems not inclined to restrict his analysis to the "decisional" period alone. His independent variables cover a wide range of data unrestricted by a specified time period. Thus in respect to the Korean situation, Rosenau is inclined to examine any factors or variables which the observer feels might affect the efforts of the United States to "calculatedly control" the Korean situation, regardless of the time period associated with the supposed determinant.

Rosenau's "independent variables" indicate the "ingredients" of any pre-theory explicating external behavior. Presumably, Rosenau's independent variables are also empirically applicable to the Korean situation.<sup>29</sup> Specifically, the United States "undertaking" in the Korean situation should be explicable in terms of Rosenau's stipulated general ingredients or independent variables.

Unlike Snyder's subjective analysis of independent variables, Rosenau attempts to rank the determinants of an undertaking and assess the variables' relative potencies on an objective basis. The potency of the independent variables explicating a given undertaking are "assessed in terms of distinctions between large and small countries, between developed and underdeveloped economies, and between open and closed political systems."<sup>30</sup> At this point, unfortunately, the distinction between dichotomous entities is defined in-







adequately and requires considerably more precise operational definitions. To be useful, particularly in borderline situations, "cut-off points" and units of measurement (i.e. perhaps a specified G.N.P. separating developed and underdeveloped countries) must be clearly established.

For the purposes of this analysis, however, the categories as they now stand are sufficient. The United States, quite clearly in Rosenau's analysis, is considered a "large country," possessing a "developed economy" and an "open political system." In fact, one cannot help but feel that perhaps the framework was set up precisely with the United States in mind. In terms of Rosenau's pre-theory the "variable clusters" explaining the Korean "undertaking" are to be ranked in the following order in terms of potency: role, societal, governmental, systemic and idiosyncratic.<sup>31</sup> Other "confounding variables" such as the influence of "issues," "penetration" and "feedback," however, must also be considered for their effect on the ranking of the five independent variables.

From the very outset of analysis Rosenau's variables have not been carefully described or operationally defined. Idiosyncratic variables are conceived to include "all those aspects of a decision-maker--his values, talents, and prior experiences--that distinguish his foreign policy choices from that of every other decision-maker."<sup>32</sup> Unfortunately, although Rosenau implies that rather gross data is required in distinguishing the idiosyncracies of decision-makers, he gives no indication of precisely what kinds of data are needed



or how they are to be acquired. In a detailed analysis, for example, no two decision-makers would be alike. Rosenau does not specify the level at which he would analyze the values, talents or prior experiences of a decision-maker. If idiosyncratic variables are to be significant in analysis they must be further defined and clarified.

Attempting to indicate significant idiosyncratic "facts" concerning the distinctive foreign policy behavior of President Truman and the other key decision-makers (particularly Secretary of State Acheson and Secretary of Defense Johnson) illustrates further problems in data collection and the distinctions between variable clusters. Although Rosenau states that the external behavior of officials is often "generated by the roles they occupy and that would be likely to occur irrespective of the idiosyncracies of the role occupants,"<sup>33</sup> it is particularly difficult to differentiate between the two variable clusters. For example, are Truman's "perceptions" or "conceptions of his role" relevant to the cluster of idiosyncratic variables or to the role variables? According to Paige, "Mr. Truman's concept of his role included belief in the desirability of a strong presidency, an image of himself as a champion of the common man with a historical mission, and a confident willingness to accept responsibility for decisions."<sup>34</sup> Unfortunately, it is difficult, given Rosenau's operational definitions, to decide whether such "facts" are relevant to the idiosyncracies of Mr. Truman or whether they pertain more generally to the





function of "leadership" and as such are better conceived as role variables. What appears to be the case, is that idiosyncratic and role variables are at the same time interdependent and mutually exclusive. Role variables are presently conceived to operate when idiosyncratic factors do not, and vice versa. Operational definitions must clearly define the boundaries between variable clusters. At this time such explicit definitions are obviously lacking.

Closely associated with the cluster of role variables are the "governmental variables." Governmental variables, according to Rosenau, "refer to those aspects of a government's structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices made by decision-makers."<sup>35</sup> Although a decision-maker's "role" is at least partially dependent upon governmental structure, governmental variables are conceived more broadly than simple role-defining rules. Governmental variables appear significant in the sense, for example, of the separation of the powers of the executive and legislative branches of government in the United States. Noting the influence of some governmental variables in the Korean situation is not particularly difficult. Obviously, the division of responsibility between the executive and the legislative branches of government greatly affected the response in the Korean situation. As a result of "structure," initial decision-makers in the Korean situation were involved on an ad hoc, unstructured basis. The structured governmental body responsible for such questions of defence--the National





Security Council--was not even consulted. Essentially, it appears that Rosenau is concerned with structure which affects, either negatively or positively, the flexibility of a foreign policy response.

However, to use Rosenau's example, the "impact of executive-legislative relations on American foreign policy" is not always as simple or clear-cut as it may appear. Paige notes that

in June 1950 the relationships between the Administration and the Congress were characterized by a complex set of conflictful, supportive, avoidant, and hortative relationships. The President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense were all under critical attack--the President for his overall leadership, Secretary Acheson for his China policies and for harboring subversives, and Secretary Johnson for sacrificing military needs to budgetary compression.<sup>36</sup>

Perhaps such an assessment is too detailed to be considered as a governmental variable. Nevertheless, the above interpretation of executive-legislative relations does fit within Rosenau's "definition" of a governmental variable. The possibility exists, nevertheless, that the attack on the executive, although formally initiated by Congress, was symptomatic and, in fact, instigated under the pressure of public opinion. Congress is itself certainly "structured" to express or represent what may in fact be interpreted as societal opinion and as such might be considered rather as a societal variable. Again it would appear that Rosenau has failed to provide adequate operational definitions or units of measurement for his variables.



Unlike Snyder, Rosenau stresses the importance of the observer's examining independent variables which are extraneous to the decisional unit. Rosenau's "extraneous" variables are divided into "societal" and "systemic" variable clusters. Societal variables are conceived to consist of the "non-governmental aspects of a society which influence external behavior."<sup>37</sup> Systemic variables include "any nonhuman aspects of a society's external environment or any actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise influence the choices made by its officials."<sup>38</sup> Although these are perhaps the most significant variable clusters in terms of Rosenau's approach (as opposed to Snyder's), Rosenau again has made little or no attempt to indicate typologies of variables within each cluster. The formulation of typologies and operational definitions distinguishing between variable clusters and variable typologies would appear essential to the development of general theory.

In respect to the Korean situation, Rosenau's open-ended definitions of societal and systemic variables give minimal direction to the process of data gathering and categorization of explanatory factors. The researcher is given no specific guidelines as to what kinds of societal or systemic variables may be important to the analysis. Given the framework's direction, the systematic investigation of societal and systemic variables, at this time, is impossible. Analysis presently can be little more than a historical reconstruction of general factors intuitively judged as relevant





to the particular situation. An inquiry of this type, however, would serve little purpose in the expansion of a scientifically conscious discipline.

Other factors functioning as "independent variables" in Rosenau's framework (earlier considered as "confounding variables") should also be examined for their operational qualities. The variables, although interrelated, are analytically separable into problems involving "feedback," "issues" and "penetration."

The feedback problem is specifically connected to Rosenau's broad conception of foreign policy seen in terms of "undertakings." Explicating a foreign policy undertaking is conceived to involve factors that unfold over time until the course of action initiated comes to completion in a stipulated preserved or altered situation. An undertaking is seen to be influenced by events which occur as a reaction to the undertaking itself or those which occur independently of the "undertaking." In Rosenau's words, "both within and outside the society that initiates a foreign policy undertaking events occur or situations emerge as it unfolds that are significantly potent to feedback into the undertaking as determinants of its future course."<sup>39</sup>

As it was noted earlier, Rosenau's dependent variable or undertaking in the Korean situation would be conceived rather broadly in terms of preserving the territorial integrity of the Republic of South Korea. Rosenau's dependent variable is clearly of a wider scope than Snyder's conception



of the dependent variable in terms of decisions. In fact, Rosenau's concept of "feedback" appears related to Snyder's concept of decision. Rosenau emphasizes that "the limitations inherent in decisions as dependent variables can be readily grasped by noting that ordinarily a society must engage in a series of behaviors and not a single behavior in order to preserve or alter a situation abroad."<sup>40</sup> This is readily demonstrated by the Korean situation. Snyder and Paige indicate that the Korean situation (considering only the decisional period) involved nine decisions and nine separate decisional units of which, in their opinion, the decision to use American forces in direct combat support of the R.O.K. forces constituted the "core" decision.<sup>41</sup> In Rosenau's opinion, however, the crucial aspect is not the decisions themselves but the information and external factors leading to these decisions which appear to constitute feedback. Feedback, likely either societal or systemic, thus constitutes a particular type of independent variable and may significantly alter the path of action.

While a concept of "feedback" is essential to Rosenau's framework, operationalizing such complexity is a difficult task. Feedback process requires that the "analyst be able not only to predict how the national society of interest to him will respond to stimuli, but also to anticipate internal and external reactions to its behavior in order to know what feedback process will be operative as independent variables."<sup>42</sup> Fortunately, according to Rosenau, the analyst need only be





concerned with what he calls "robust variables."<sup>43</sup> In other words, only responses and events that may significantly affect the path of action need be examined. Additionally, Rosenau maintains that much of the knowledge required to anticipate and account for feedback processes is acquired prior to initiation of the undertaking. For example, in the Korean situation feedback variables such as the U.S.S.R.'s inability to influence a North Korean withdrawal, and even the "Chinese intervention" in the Korean conflict, could have been foreseen prior to their occurrence as feedback variables and consequently considered in the initial undertaking. Unfortunately, aside from emphasizing the importance of feedback variables in altering the direction of an undertaking, Rosenau makes little attempt to conceptually incorporate such an important variable into his framework. Such conceptual modification would appear to be necessary to the development of his general approach.

Intricately connected with the "feedback" problem of foreign policy research is Rosenau's rather unique concern with what he calls "issue-area phenomena."<sup>44</sup> Earlier it was noted that "the functioning of any type of political system can vary significantly from one issue-area to another."<sup>45</sup> According to Rosenau, "evidence is mounting that the values at stake in a conflict operate as sources of the behavior of the parties to it; that individuals, officials, and groups behave differently in different issue-areas; and that therefore the dynamics of political processes and political systems





vary from one issue-area to another."<sup>46</sup> Apparently, the values at stake in a particular issue-area motivate participants to respond in differing manners in much the same fashion as a "value-cost" assessment motivated Snyder's decision-makers. In other words, in Rosenau's view, the contents of a policy or undertaking themselves operate as independent variables.

Operationalizing such an independent variable, as Rosenau's framework demonstrates, is an extremely delicate and complex task. Operationalizing issue-area variables requires answers to at least three questions:

How are the values over which men differ to be clustered together into issue-areas? At what level of abstraction should they be clustered? What characteristics render the behavior evoked by one cluster of values distinctive from that stimulated by other clusters?<sup>47</sup>

Rosenau goes on to state that a typology must be "cast in sufficiently abstract terms to encompass past and future clusters of values as well as present ones" and that the level of abstraction should be high enough to invoke behavior in all types of horizontal systems (i.e. local to international).<sup>48</sup> Rosenau believes that all behavior designed to bring about the authoritative allocation of values occurs in four issue-areas: the territorial, states, human resources, and nonhuman resources areas.<sup>49</sup> Rosenau's issue-area typologies are derived from an impression that motives, action and interaction are related to the degree of tangibility of the values that have to be allocated and the means that must be employed. The



tangibility-intangibility dichotomy (as it becomes) is "operationalized in terms of whether the values involved can be photographed with a camera and that the tangibility of means is measured by the extent to which money must be expended in order to acquire the values."<sup>50</sup>

Such definitions, however, are not easily operationalizable. Often it is not clear, for example, precisely what values are involved in a given situation. In the Korean situation the "value" component (or in a broader sense the "end") involves the preservation of territorial independence or the "sovereignty" of an independent entity. Not only is it difficult to operationalize such a value (i.e. can one photograph the value of "sovereignty?"), although it would appear to be an intangible value, it is also questionable whether this is in fact the value at stake. On what basis, for example, does one decide what value is at stake? Intuition? The statements of decision-makers? The perceived relevancies of the decision-makers? Clearly Rosenau needs an operational definition of how value relevancy is to be determined in addition to an operational definition separating tangible values.

Similar operational difficulties are involved in the examination of tangible and intangible means. However, the operational definition assumes that the values involved have been established. The Korean situation, for example, appears to involve both tangible and intangible means--i.e. money may or may not be involved. Achieving a value such as the preservation of sovereignty may involve, at different periods of





time, diplomatic persuasion or the use of military force. The former, according to Rosenau, involves intangible means, and the latter tangible means. During the Korean "undertaking" both tangible and intangible means were attempted. Apparently, however, Rosenau intends to analyze means only in terms of the long run. Ultimately, the Korean matter will probably be settled by diplomatic persuasion rather than by military means. Consequently, the Korean situation may be considered as involving intangible means. Nevertheless, it would still seem that the Korean situation belongs more in the territorial issue-area involving more tangible than intangible means. Clearly, Rosenau's issue-area typologies, as they presently exist, are difficult to operationalize and require considerable refinement.

Within the Korean situation it is, however, questionable whether an issue-area, in fact, existed for the group of actors involved. "Foreign policies are regarded as issues within the area only if the controversy over them persists and extends to major segments of the society's governmental organization or to segments of its public."<sup>51</sup> Ex post facto analysis of the Korean situation appears to confirm that decision-makers and other actors in the situation at the outset demonstrated a unique degree of conformity in their assessments of the values involved and the means required to support or achieve those values. Controversy does not appear to arise until much later in the undertaking (i.e. Truman-McArthur controversy). When one considers the mixture of



issue-relevance and irrelevance it is difficult to determine exactly the status of issue-area phenomena in the Korean situation. Rosenau does not appear to consider the difficulty in operationalizing mixed situations a relatively long period of time.

One final "confounding factor" functioning as an independent variable should also be examined. A key aspect of Rosenau's analysis is the conclusion that "non-members of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals."<sup>52</sup> A "discovery" of such importance, in Rosenau's view, requires conceptual modification--the creation of a new political system--the penetrated system.

Rosenau himself states that obviously operationalization of the distinction between penetration and non-penetration will prove difficult. For example,

When does an interaction between two actors consist of autonomous acts, and when does it amount to joint action? When are non-members of a society participants in its politics, and when are they just influential non-participants? Furthermore, how extensive must the participation by non-members be in order that a penetrated political system may come into existence?<sup>53</sup>

Although indicating that operational answers to these questions must necessarily be arbitrary, Rosenau fails to define (even arbitrarily) how the above questions are to be answered.

Presumably, penetrated systems are "characterized by





a shortage of capabilities on the part of the penetrated society and that an effort to compensate for, or take advantage of, this shortage underlies the participation of non-members in its politics."<sup>54</sup> Considering such a definition the United States, with its massive resources and capabilities, could hardly have been considered a penetrated political system at the time of the Korean situation. Rosenau, however, indicates contrarily that "plenitude" also serves to attract participation by non-members who wish aid or political support.<sup>55</sup> Conceivably, South Korea or other "agents" might have participated more or less directly in the mobilization of support for the "undertaking." Clearly uncovering evidence of penetration raises considerable problems of data collection and accessibility.

The above attempts at "processing raw materials" using the frameworks established by Snyder and Rosenau, respectively, illustrates a number of differences and similarities between the two approaches. Obviously, neither Snyder's nor Rosenau's categories, as they are presently defined, are easily applicable to empirical data. Nevertheless, it appears that the difficulties inherent in Rosenau's approach may be more easily modified than those in Snyder's approach. Rosenau's categories are ambiguous and imprecisely defined. Snyder, however, as his indecisiveness in regard to independent variables indicates, finds it extremely difficult even to decide in a broad fashion what areas of concern may be important to analysis. Decision-making, additionally, is bothered by the





critical problem of accessibility to empirical data. This problem, for the most part, does not affect Rosenau's approach. Furthermore, it seems clear from the operational attempts that Rosenau's framework finds it impossible to deal adequately with a short crisis period of action which involves decisions as the core of the action. Likewise, operationalizing Snyder's scheme in respect to action sustained over a long period of time, in which a decision is not particularly significant, is likely to prove unproductive of adequate explanation or ultimately of general theory.



## Conclusion

Rosenau and Snyder exhibit divergent approaches in the analysis of foreign policy phenomena. Indeed, at the outset of analysis it is evident that they are interested in different questions. Snyder's "frame of reference" is directed toward the explication of foreign policy "decisions" while Rosenau's "pre-theory" is intended to explain a broader range of data--the foreign policy "undertaking." Undoubtedly as a function of their choice of dependent variables, Snyder's and Rosenau's respective analyses are directed at different levels. Snyder's approach clearly is dependent upon empirical data of a more detailed variety than those required by Rosenau. Also differentiating the two approaches is their differing response to the phenomenological issue. Furthermore, this "issue" appears directly related to the question of operationalization, as the utility of Snyder's scheme is adversely affected by problems of data accessibility inherent in a phenomenological orientation.

In spite of the above major differences, the approaches of Snyder and Rosenau both experience difficulties with empirical data. Snyder's categories, it has been noted, are illusively stipulated (constantly changing) and imprecisely defined. Rosenau's categories, while much more clearly stipulated, are, like Snyder's, extremely difficult to operation-





alize. However, given Rosenau's non-phenomenological orientation, more exacting effort may establish adequate categories. The operationalization of Snyder's categories will, it is suspected, prove much more difficult.



## Footnotes

### Introduction

<sup>1</sup>See particularly, K. W. Thompson, "The Study of International Politics: A Survey of Trends and Developments," Theory and Practice of International Relations ed. D. S. McClelland, W. C. Olson and F. A. Sonderrmann (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1960), pp. 10-19.

<sup>2</sup>H. Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach," Contending Approaches to International Politics ed. K. Knorr and J. N. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 20-38.

<sup>3</sup>F. S. Dunn, "The Present Course of International Relations Research," World Politics, II (October, 1949), p. 81.

<sup>4</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Introductory Note," International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory ed. J. N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 5.

<sup>5</sup>S. Hoffmann, "Commentary: Problems of Scope, Method and Purpose," Contemporary Theory in International Relations ed. S. Hoffmann (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 8.

<sup>6</sup>C. A. McClelland, "The Function of Theory in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, IV (September, 1960), p. 311.

<sup>7</sup>O. R. Young, A Systemic Approach to International Politics (Princeton, N. J.: Research Monograph No. 33, 1968), pp. 4-5.

<sup>8</sup>See, F. A. Sonderrmann, "The Linkage between Foreign Policy and International Politics," International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory ed. J. N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 15.

<sup>9</sup>R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and B. Sapin, "Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics," Foreign Policy Decision Making ed. R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and B. Sapin (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 14-177. Although he calls his scheme an "approach to International Politics," Snyder is clearly concerned with the "actions" rather than the "interactions" of states.



- <sup>10</sup>G. Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1962).
- <sup>11</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," Approaches to Comparative and International Politics ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27-92.
- <sup>12</sup>R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and B. Sapin, "Introduction" Foreign Policy Decision Making, p. 2.
- <sup>13</sup>J. N. Rosenau, op. cit., pp. 89 and 92.
- <sup>14</sup>One critic of the decision-making approach states that "until a greater measure of theory is introduced into the proposal and the relations among variables are specified more concretely, it is likely to remain little more than a setting-out of categories and, like any taxonomy, fairly limited in utility." H. McClosky, "Concerning Strategies for a Science of International Politics" Foreign Policy Decision Making, pp. 199-200.

### Chapter One

- <sup>1</sup>R. C. Snyder, footnote, H. C. Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations: Definition of Scope" International Behavior: A Social Psychological Analysis ed. H. C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 20. In this paper "level" is primarily used in the sense of the second and third meanings.
- <sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 20.
- <sup>3</sup>R. Brody, "The Study of International Politics qua Science: The Emphasis on Methods and Techniques," Contending Approaches to International Politics ed. K. Knorr and J. N. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 113.
- <sup>4</sup>J. David Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations," The International System: Theoretical Essays ed. K. Knorr and S. Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 77.
- <sup>5</sup>A. Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics," Theoretical Aspects of International Relations ed. W. T. R. Fox (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 83.
- <sup>6</sup>"The choice of a unit of analysis is in effect an answer to the question: 'What do I measure or observe when I investigate the actions of nations, the interactions of nations or the factors causing these behaviors.'" R. A. Brody, op. cit., p. 115.





<sup>7</sup>Op. cit., p. 83.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>R. C. North, O. R. Holsti, M. G. Zaninovich and D. A. Zinnes, Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 5.

<sup>11</sup>J. David Singer, op. cit., p. 80.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>13</sup>W. F. Hanrieder, "Actor Objectives and International Systems," The Journal of Politics XXVII, No. 1 (February, 1965), p. 109.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 110.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>R. C. Snyder, et al. "Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics." Op. cit., p. 64. Treating the decision-maker as an "actor in a situation" is the essence of what Snyder calls "action analysis."

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 65. (Emphasis in original.)

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., pp. 65 and 87. "[T]he definitions of the situation which we consider to be central to the explanation of state behavior result from decision-making processes in an organizational context." (p. 87).

<sup>19</sup>In Snyder's own words, the unit "is an observer's analytic device to allow identification and isolation of those actions and activities which are of concern to him." Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>20</sup>R. C. Snyder, "A Decision-making Approach to the Study of Political Phenomena" Approaches to the Study of Politics ed. R. Young (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1958), p. 20.

<sup>21</sup>J. N. Rosenau, footnote, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," op. cit., p. 41.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.



<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 42.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 42-43. Rosenau's levels of analysis are similar to the six levels used by R. C. North, et al., Content Analysis pp. 5-7. The six levels of analysis were international or world system, society or nation system, institution, organization, group, and individual.

<sup>30</sup>This is also the view of W. F. Honrieder, "Actor Objectives and International Systems" 109-32. "International and Comparative Politics: Toward a Synthesis" World Politics, XX, No. 3, (April, 1968), 480-493 and "Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review LXI (December, 1967), 971-982.

<sup>31</sup>Snyder does consider other levels but not ostensibly as integral and formal parts of his analysis. Data from other levels are only included in analysis through the medium of the decision-maker. This difference will be fully considered in the following two chapters.

## Chapter Two

<sup>1</sup>L. P. Bloomfield, "The Political Scientist and Foreign Policy," Political Science and Public Policy ed. A. Ranney (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968), p. 182.

<sup>2</sup>"A variable is said to be independent when a change in it precedes and presumably causes the change in a related variable; and, obviously, a variable is said to be dependent when a change in it is contingent on change in another." V. Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 38.

<sup>3</sup>R. C. Snyder, et al., op. cit., p. 65.

<sup>4</sup>"The definition of the situation is built around the projected action as well as the reasons for the action." Ibid., p. 65. Basically such a definition is an orientation to action and is the result of three features: perception, choice and expectation. Ibid., p. 66. How Snyder handles these features in his framework will be more fully discussed later in this chapter and in the section on "operationalization."





<sup>5</sup>Snyder states that "action exists (analytically) when the following components can be ascertained: actor (actors), goals, means, and situation." Ibid., p. 64. The same components are necessary for a decision.

<sup>6</sup>R. C. Snyder and J. A. Robinson, "Decision-making in International Politics," International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis ed. H. C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 437.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid. Note: The primary aspect of a decision is the internal process of alternative selection and definition of the situation. Execution here is apparently conceived as the simple formal statement of a decision and should not be interpreted more broadly in terms of implementation.

<sup>8</sup>R. C. Snyder et al., op. cit., p. 33.

<sup>9</sup>J. N. Rosenau, op. cit., p. 32.

<sup>10</sup>See, J. N. Rosenau, "Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis, and Scientific Consciousness in Foreign Policy Research," Political Science and Public Policy ed. A. Ranney (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968), 197-236 and; "Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy, or Field," International Studies Quarterly XII, No. 3, (September, 1968), 296-329.

<sup>11</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis, and Scientific Consciousness in Foreign Policy Research," op. cit., p. 211.

<sup>12</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy, or Field," op. cit., p. 312.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., and J. N. Rosenau, "Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis . . . , " op. cit., p. 215.

<sup>14</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis . . . , " op. cit., p. 222.

<sup>15</sup>As a field, Rosenau believes that foreign policy is divisible into three stages--"initiatory," "implementive" and "responsive." J. N. Rosenau, "Comparative Foreign Policy . . . , " op. cit., pp. 311-312.

<sup>16</sup>O. Young, A Systemic Approach to International Politics, op. cit., p. 27.

<sup>17</sup>The clarity of each scheme will be more fully considered in Chapter Four. The question of significance will primarily be analyzed in Chapter Three.

<sup>18</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories . . . , " op. cit., p. 53.



<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., pp. 42-43. For a more complete examination of these variables see Chapter Four.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 71.

<sup>23</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis . . . , " op. cit., p. 216.

<sup>24</sup>"Setting is really a set of categories of potentially relevant factors and conditions which may affect the action of any state . . . an analytical device to suggest certain enduring kinds of relevancies and to limit the number of non-governmental factors with which the student of international politics must be concerned." R. C. Snyder et al., op. cit., p. 67.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 105.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 113.

<sup>28</sup>R. C. Snyder, "A Decision-Making Approach to the Study of Political Phenomena," op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>29</sup>R. C. Snyder, et al., op. cit., p. 138. Snyder's discussion of "spheres of competence" and "communication and information" together constitute 30 pages of this analysis (pp. 106-36) while "motivation" itself covers 34 pages (pp. 137-171). The first two independent variables are largely omitted also in his later "empirical application of the decision-making framework.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 137.

<sup>31</sup>R. C. Snyder, "A Decision-making Approach to the Study of Political Phenomena," op. cit., p. 32.

<sup>32</sup>R. C. Snyder et al., op. cit., pp. 149-150.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 150.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 151.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 153.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 160.



<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 168.

<sup>39</sup>Snyder states that motives are of two types: (1) "in order to," and (2) "because of" motives. "In order to" motives are concerned with a future state of an act--its relationship to an ultimate end from which motive can be inferred. "Because of" motives would necessitate almost a psychoanalytic approach attempting to undercover past experience. Snyder is primarily concerned with motives of the first type. To examine personality in idiosyncratic terms, in Snyder's opinion would infer almost an examination of "because of" motives. This would make analysis exceedingly difficult and, in his view, should be avoided if possible. See Ibid., p. 161.

### Chapter Three

<sup>1</sup>J. David Sinder, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations," op. cit., p. 86.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 77-92.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 88.

<sup>5</sup>Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 5.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>7</sup>R. C. Snyder, et al., "Introduction," op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>8</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories . . . ," op. cit., p. 49.

<sup>9</sup>R. C. Snyder, et al., op. cit., p. 65.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 136.

<sup>11</sup>R. C. Snyder, "A Decision-Making Approach to the Study of Political Phenomena," op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>12</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories . . . ," op. cit., p. 47.

<sup>13</sup>For combination of these categories see Table 4, Ibid., pp. 90-91.

<sup>14</sup>Whenever idiosyncratic variables assume a primary place in analysis. See Table 4, Ibid.





<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 43.

<sup>16</sup>P. J. McGowan, "Africa and Non-alignment: A Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly XII, No. 3 (September, 1968), p. 263.

<sup>17</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories . . . ," p. 37.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "The Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis" Contemporary Political Analysis ed. J. C. Charlesworth (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 209.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy, or Field," op. cit., p. 312.

<sup>22</sup>J. D. Singer, op. cit., p. 87.

<sup>23</sup>R. C. Snyder, et al., op. cit., p. 33.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

#### Chapter Four

<sup>1</sup>R. C. Snyder, "International Relations Theory--Continued," World Politics XIII, (February, 1961), p. 309.

<sup>2</sup>G. Modelski, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>3</sup>R. C. Snyder and G. D. Paige, "The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytic Scheme," Foreign Policy Decision Making pp. 206-248. Another useful empirical application is G. Paige's own attempt: The Korean Decision (New York: Free Press, 1968).

<sup>4</sup>R. C. Snyder and G. D. Paige, op. cit., p. 209.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 210.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 214.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 242.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 225.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.



<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 241.

<sup>11</sup>R. C. Snyder, et al., p. 136.

<sup>12</sup>G. Paige, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>13</sup>R. C. Snyder and G. D. Paige, op. cit., p. 243.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 244.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Snyder makes some conceptual adjustment in conceiving the "occasion for decision," the "individual decision-maker," and the "organizational context" ("situational," "individual" and "organizational") as the three major factors or variables explaining a "decisional outcome." R. C. Snyder and J. A. Robinson, op. cit., pp. 440-463. This adjustment, however, does not seem to significantly change the analysis. The change only makes formal the fact that "spheres of competence" and "communication and information" as separate independent variables have been largely neglected and generally have been subsumed under other categories, particularly the organizational variable. The new "situational" variable is primarily concerned with the minor factor of decisional "time" and does not affect the scope of the analysis.

<sup>17</sup>R. C. Snyder and G. D. Paige, op. cit., p. 214.

<sup>18</sup>J. Frankel, "Towards a Decision-Making Model in Foreign Policy," Political Studies VII, No. 1 (February, 1959), p. 7.

<sup>19</sup>G. Modelski, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

<sup>20</sup>S. Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 53.

<sup>21</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "The Premises and Promises . . .," op. cit., p. 209.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 207.

<sup>24</sup>This "impact" is particularly strong as Rosenau was a graduate student working with Snyder during the formative years of the decision-making approach.

<sup>25</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis, and Scientific Consciousness . . .," op. cit., p. 212.





<sup>26</sup>See J. N. Rosenau, Calculated Control as a Unifying Concept in the Study of International Politics and Foreign Policy, Research Monograph No. 15 (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1963).

<sup>27</sup>R. C. Snyder and G. D. Paige, op. cit., p. 230.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 231.

<sup>29</sup>It should be noted that Rosenau has a very low regard for "case studies." In his view, "case studies" are too individualistic and detailed; and are therefore, unproductive of comparison and the cumulation of data. The "case" approach is used at this point, however, mainly as an empirical test of his categories or approach generally.

<sup>30</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories . . . ,"  
op. cit., p. 47.

<sup>31</sup>See Table 4, Ibid., pp. 90-91.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 43.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>G. Paige, op. cit., p. 22.

<sup>35</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories . . . ,"  
op. cit., p. 43.

<sup>36</sup>G. Paige, op. cit., p. 42.

<sup>37</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories . . . ,"  
op. cit., p. 43.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis, and Scientific Consciousness . . . ,"  
op. cit., p. 216.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 212.

<sup>41</sup>R. C. Snyder and G. D. Paige, op. cit., pp. 237-238.

<sup>42</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis, and Scientific Consciousness . . . ,"  
op. cit., p. 217.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Actually, issue-area phenomena was earlier considered important to decision-making. See A. Wilkavsky, "The Analysis of Issue-contents in the Study of Decision-Making," The Journal of Politics XXIV, No. 4 (November, 1962), pp. 717-732.



<sup>45</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories . . . ," op. cit., p. 71.

<sup>46</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis, and Scientific Consciousness . . . ," op. cit., p. 219.

<sup>47</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories . . . ," op. cit., p. 82.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>See diagram, Ibid., p. 86.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>51</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area," Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy ed. J. N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 22-23.

<sup>52</sup>J. N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories . . . ," p. 52.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 68.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 69.



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